We show that the impact of globalization on growth and wages crucially depends on the labor market structures of the countries involved. We contrast bargaining and perfect competition. Under perfect capital markets, convergence of capital and income per capita always occurs despite di®erent labor market structures. However, di®erent labor market structures prevent convergence of the income shares, with unionized countries showing a lower wage rate and consequent capital in°ows. Therefore, unionization, not globalization, is the cause of discrepancies in the within-country income-distribution patterns. Openness is always preferable to autarky for a small developing economy, independently of its labor market structure.
Introduction
The current expansion in international trade and capital°ows has linked the economic performances of the developed countries to those of the developing countries as never before.
1 However, the process of integration has been much faster for capital markets than for labor markets and their institutional structure. Within the ongoing debate on the impact of globalization, its potential connection with the issue of labor markets rigidities has not yet been addressed. The main contribution of this paper is therefore to uncover the implications of di®erential labor market structures for an integrated world.
The crucial questions that have been raised, and that are still largely unanswered, are the following: Does globalization induce convergence of income and wages? Do workers in rich countries always lose from globalization? And what is the impact on workers in the developing countries? With respect to the¯rst question, i.e., the relationship between globalization and convergence, perfect international capital markets are conventionally viewed as an element that strengthens the case for convergence, and can indeed assure its instantaneous achievement. 2 In this paper we explore the potential impact on income convergence of di®erential labor market structures, thus departing from the perfect-competition benchmark with a special focus on to the markets for labor. The second and third questions have to do with the e®ect of globalization on wages, both in the developed and the developing countries, and in particular with its implications for the relative balance of power between capital and labor within each country. The framework we provide, which distinguishes between di®erent labor market structures, allows to evaluate these questions from a novel perspective.
The e®ect of globalization on wages in developing country has so far received only super¯cial attention in the economic literature, 3 despite the fact that in developing countries labor is an abundant resource. Moreover, in a situation where the developing countries' capital thirst cannot be satiated by the scarcer and scarcer saving of the developed 1 See Dowrick and De Long (2001) and Lindert and Williamson (2001) for a recent assessment with a historical perspective.
2 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) . 3 A notable exception is Krugman and Venables (1995) .
countries, domestic labor income plays a crucial role in the process of development. Thus, labor market institutions, and in particular labor-union strength and organization, do carry very important implications for growth in emerging countries. Some of them, such as Eastern Europe, Israel, India, South Africa, and many Latin American countries, have a long tradition of unionization, while others, especially the East Asian NICs, can be viewed as an archetypal case for laissez faire. 4 We will show how these countries' relative performances depend crucially not only on the structure of their local labor markets, but also on their decision to open up their economies, and on the labor market structure of their partners. unions constitute an element of rigidity in the market for labor, wage bargaining keeps the level of the wages below the competitive one.
We then look at all the possible combinations of market structures in the small and in the large economy. The vantage point will be that of the small developing economy.
We work under the assumption that capital is internationally mobile and labor is not. This assumption is a reasonable one, both empirically and intuitively, since indeed labor tends to be more geographically committed than capital. The framework we develop produces new, and sometimes surprising results, which show that the impact of globalization on convergence and income distribution depends in an interesting and complex way on relative labor market structures. Our main results are the following: 1. Despite the fact that convergence of capital and income per capita always occurs because of international capital mobility, di®erent labor market structures prevent convergence of the factors' shares of income, with unionized countries showing a lower wage share than countries with competitive labor markets. 2. Openness is always bene¯cial for a developing small country, because it induces convergence to higher per-capita levels of income, capital and wages, independently of the way the wage share is determined by its labor market structure.
The content of this paper draws on three di®erent¯elds of economics: Labor, growth, and international. It is therefore linked with a large literature. As we already mentioned, our paper focuses on labor markets and wages in developing countries, and therefore can be seen as complementary to the much larger, previously-cited literature that examines the e®ects of trade on wages in advanced countries, including for example Krugman (1997) and Rodrik (1997) , who examine the e®ect of globalization on the balance of power between capital and labor, and Wood (1994) , who studies the evolution of the wage gap. A recent literature has examined the empirical determinants of wages in an international perspective, including developing countries. Rodrik (1999) and Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) acknowledge the relevance of institutions to labor market outcomes, but do not look at the potential e®ect on wages of the di®erences in the labor market structures of the most relevant partners. Wood (1999) and Saba Arbache (2001) also¯nd that globalization has had di®erent impact on developing countries depending on their local labor market structures, even though they focus on within-country wage dispersion rather than on the international comparison of wage levels. Despite these¯ndings, therefore, there is still lack of empirical evidence on the speci¯c relationship between globalization and unionization. Our model uncovers a novel connection between capital amrket liberalization and labor institutions which can guide future empirical investigation and had not yet been captured in the existing theoretical work. In fact, each of the following theoretical contributions addresses a speci¯c facet of the broader and more complex question which is the focus of this paper. For example, on the relationship between international trade and growth, Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Young (1991) have shown that international trade can be harmful for growth because it can shift production away from sectors with positive learning-by-doing e®ects. However, they assume that labor markets are perfectly competitive worldwide. The relevance of imperfect competition for trade and growth has been shown, for example, by Helpman and Krugman (1989) . However, they focus on the structure of product markets, not of labor markets. Another group of papers, among which Devereux and Lockwood (1991) , Bean and Pissarides (1993) , and Bertola (1994) , has studied the growth impact of unions' behavior within a closed economy. Recent papers by Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) have investigated the impact of di®erences in wage-setting institutions on taxation and growth with reference to OECD countries. Blanchard and Philippon (2002) look at the evolution in the role of unions in the face of rent decline. Lucas (1990) initiated a huge literature where several types of capital market imperfections are introduced in order to explain the empirically large discrepancies in rates of return and the associated lack of convergence. Abstracting from the question of convergence and growth, Merz and Ramchand (1999) study labor market frictions in an open economy, while Huizinga (1993) and Rama (1994) focus on unions' behavior in internationally-integrated markets. Finally, there is a related strand of the literature that has examined static, open economies where the labor markets are non-competitive (see, for example, Dixit (1978) ).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the closed-economy version of the model under two di®erent labor market structures, perfect competition and bargaining.
In Section 3 we turn to the open economy. We start with a quick review of the competitive 
The Closed Economy
In order to describe the basic structure of the model and in particular the nature of the bargaining problem, we start with a closed economy. We employ a simple version of the Diamond (1965) overlapping-generations model with capital accumulation. We assume a one-good economy where agents live for two periods and have perfect foresight. They are endowed with one unit of labor 7 that they inelastically supply in the¯rst period of their life.
Consumption in the second period must be¯nanced from savings, s t . For simplicity, there is no population growth and full capital depreciation at the end of each period. An individual born in period t has preferences over consumption when young, c t t , and consumption when old, c t t+1 . In order to obtain a closed-form solution, we assume Cobb-Douglas preferences,
Within each period output is produced via a standard neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production function. That is, output produced at
where K t and L t are the quantities of capital and labor employed, respectively, and k t = K t =L t is the ratio of capital to labor.
The production function is assumed to be increasing and concave.
In the following discussion, each speci¯c institutional structure of the labor market will be taken as given, i.e., it will not be optimally determined within the model.
A Competitive Labor Market
Pro¯t maximization under perfect competition in the markets for all factors of production yields the following standard expressions for the interest rate, r t , and the wage rate, w t :
We assume labor quality to be homogeneous. Therefore we abstract from di®erences in skill levels. 8 These preferences rule out any in°uence of the interest rate on saving decisions. However, Giovannini (1985) questions the robustness of the literature that has tried to estimate the interest elasticity of saving, while Fry (1995) con¯rms its instability across di®erent countries and phases of the development process. Our simplifying assumption is therefore empirically justi¯ed.
i.e., factor payments equal their respective marginal products. Individuals maximize their utility function subject to the constraint c t t + c t t+1 r t+1 · w t . The capital market clearing condition s t = k t+1 -where s t is the supply and k t+1 is the demand for capital -will generate the following di®erence equation, which determines the dynamic evolution of the economy starting from any initial condition k 0 > 0:
where 1¡® is the constant propensity to save which represents the solution of the consumer's problem. Note that, because of our assumption on preferences, wage income is the only determinant of savings. The case of log-linear preferences is chosen for analytical tractability because it allows a closed-form solution. In addition, it represents a useful benchmark against which we can characterize alternative speci¯cations. In particular, our results would be reinforced under any speci¯cation that exhibits a negative elasticity of saving to the interest rate, and would still hold under a positive but su±ciently weak elasticity.
The properties of the above equation are well-known. In particular, this economy can display multiple steady-state equilibria 9 and cannot have long-run unbounded growth without redistributive taxation from capital to labor. 10 The optimality properties of the model are also well known. In particular, depending on parameter values, a steady-state equilibrium may be characterized by over-saving whenever the level of the capital-to-labor ratio is higher than the Golden Rule level. However, in keeps with the ongoing policy debate on globalization, we will abstract from steady-state utility considerations and focus on output and income maximization as a policy goal.
Bargaining in the Labor Market
We will model the bargaining process over total output using the Nash bargaining solution.
We adopt an e±cient bargaining structure, i.e., bargaining takes place over the wage and employment. However, since workers have a zero reservation wage and are all union members, they will all be employed as part of an e±cient bargain. We assume that capital is perfectly mobile and can move after any wage agreement. This implies the presence of a capital market where entrepreneurs can invest their savings in the event of no production. The existence of a capital market requires a certain degree of decentralization of the bargaining process, which implies that bargaining is conducted at the¯rm's level. 13 Once labor is allocated to a¯rm, then it becomes tied to it and is represented in the negotiation by the¯rm-speci¯c union. This modeling assumption can be linked to fundamentals factors such as¯rm-speci¯c skill characteristics and relocation costs, which could still allow some mobility, albeit at a cost. However, we make the extreme assumption that labor becomes¯xed by joining a union, to capture the role of unions as an element of rigidity in the labor market, in the face of liberalized capital markets.
Since agents live only for two periods, each subsequent generation will face an identicallyrepeated bargaining problem. Under bargaining, the individual consumption-saving decision is constrained by the expression c t t
· w t , where w t is the negotiated wage and
= r t+1 + p t+1 is the return to capital, which can di®er from the marginal product when p t+1 ; the component due to the presence of non-competitive rents, is positive.
12 This restriction on¯is required in order to avoid a solution with zero wages and no savings.
13 If bargaining were fully centralized with a single negotiator for capital and labor, there would be no market for capital. The structure we assume more closely re°ects the current state of labor relations in unionized countries. See Bertocchi (1996) for a complete analysis of the centralized-bargaining case. See also Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988) and Rama (1994) on the comparison between centralized and decentralized bargaining within a similar setup.
When this is the case, ownership of the¯rm becomes relevant. To allow for young workers to acquire both the ownership of physical capital and the ownership of the¯rm, the model has to include two assets, physical capital and¯rm's shares. To keep things simple we will assume that each period is divided into two sub-periods. Firms are set up in thē rst sub-period, while wages are paid in the second. Consider now the problem from the perspective of a young agent. In the¯rst sub-period of his life he is facing a market for shares, but his income is zero during this sub-period: therefore, even if there exists a market for shares, at the equilibrium price demand will be zero and there will be no transactions in this market. In his second period, the same agent as an old capital owner will automatically acquire ownership of the¯rm. This assumption about the timing is crucial because, while it permits the existence of a separate, parallel market for physical capital, which plays a crucial role in our model, at the same time it allows us to avoid keeping track of a second state variable, the share price, which would generate complex second order dynamics. 14 We will¯rst determine the equilibrium interest rate r t . All¯rms have access to the same constant-returns-to-scale production function. Given their labor allocation, their negotiated wage rate, and the market interest rate, an entrepreneur will choose k t to maximize the pro¯t from production which is given by f(k t ) ¡ w t ¡ r t k t . A perfectly-competitive capital market implies that the equilibrium rate of interest must be r t = f 0 ( ¹ k t ), where ¹ k t is the average capital-to-labor ratio in the economy. Thus, given any wage agreement and the equilibrium rate of interest, we know that every entrepreneur will choose to employ a level of capital in his¯rm so that the capital-to-labor ratio of the¯rm equals ¹ k t . Next, we can determine the equilibrium wage by maximizing the Nash product in (1). At each time t;
we can set W p t = w t L t , where L t is the number of members of the union at time t, and ¦ p t = Y t ¡ w t L t . 15 Since workers receive no wage when there is no agreement, we can also set W np t = 0. However, when there is no agreement with the union an entrepreneur will be able to invest his savings on the capital market at the market interest rate. In other words, capital is facing an outside option, so that ¦ np t = r t k t L t : Maximizing the resulting Nash 14 In a similar model of a closed economy, Devereux and Lockwood (1991) characterize the steady state for a fully-developed second-order system in capital and the share price.
15 See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) , Section 2.4.2, for an analogous formulation of the payo®s.
product with respect to w t gives the following levels of the wage rate, w t , and the return per unit of capital invested in the¯rm, ¼ t :
which satis¯es a \split-the-di®erence" rule. This can be seen more clearly by rewriting (2) as w t =¯f(k t ) ¡¯f 0 (k t )k t ; where the¯rst component simply re°ects the share of output which labor can appropriate given its bargaining power¯, 16 while the second accounts for the relative weakness of labor relative to capital, in a context where an outside option is only available for capital. 17
To furtherly clarify the nature of equilibrium under bargaining, notice that the negotiated wage depends on the level of capital per capita that will be used in production, but the level of capital is chosen after wage are determined, taking wages as constant in the maximization problem of the¯rm. 18 The key to this setup is that both parties rationally anticipate how much capital will be chosen. That will ultimately be determined by the previous-period saving decisions, because of the Cobb Douglas form for utility, with the rate of return simply adjusting to clear the market. Consequently, the economy displays the following equation of motion:
which is identical to a standard overlapping-generations model with saving rate (1 ¡ ®)¯,
i.e., with slower accumulation than under perfect competition and a positive relationship 16 Note that in the limiting case where¯= 1 the equilibrium approaches the competitive equilibrium. 17 The impact on the wage of an outside option for labor in the form of an unemployment bene¯t (b) would depend on the way it is¯nanced. There would be no net e®ect at all if it is¯nanced by a lump-sum tax on workers, while the wage increases with the bene¯t if it is¯nanced by a tax on entrepreneurs, since equation (2) would become wt =¯[f (kt) ¡ f 0 (kt)kt] + (1 ¡¯)b, which remains below the competitive solution as long as b is less than the competitive wage, a reasonable condition to assume.
18 In a similar dynamic framework Devereux and Lockwood (1991) consider the case of non-binding contracts and show that they may increase the capital stock, contrary to the result derived by Grout (1984) for a static model. In the present model, under non-binding contracts the capital stock would unambiguosly increase because of a higher wage (equation (2) would become wt =¯f (kt)) and the absence of the counter e®ect represented by a higher value of the¯rm shares.
between the speed of accumulation and¯. The outside option which is opened to entrepreneurs -but not to workers -thanks to the existence of a capital market introduces an asymmetry that weakens unions' power and slows down accumulation. To conclude, we have shown how wage bargaining in the presence of perfect capital markets actually leads to a lower wage than under perfect competition. This suggests that unions should take into account the fact that changes in the¯nancial sector of the economy should a®ect their goals and behavior. 19 As we shall demonstrate in the following discussion, international¯nancial integration will represent a major factor in determining the impact of unions' behavior on domestic wages.
The Open Economy

The Fully-Competitive Benchmark
We are now going to investigate what happens to a small developing economy when it interacts with an economically larger country, which can be a neighbor, a preferred trading partner, or the rest of the world. By small economy, we refer as standard to an economy whose capital stock K = kL is small with respect to the rest of the world, and therefore takes the interest rate as given. By developing economy we mean an economy whose capitalto-labor ratio k is still far from its steady state and closer to its initial condition. Conversely, a developed economy would be close to its steady state or, for simplicity, right at it. For the following discussion, we will also assume that the technology allows for the existence of a unique non-trivial steady state equilibrium (a Cobb-Douglas production function would yield this result). From the previous section, we know that the steady-state level of the capital-to-labor ratio will be higher under perfect competition than under bargaining.
We will work with the assumption of perfect capital mobility and zero labor mobility and contrast several di®erent cases with respect to the structure of the labor markets. As a benchmark, we brie°y review the case in which the labor market is perfectly competitive in both countries: When two economies, that are linked together in an international com-modity market and an international capital markets, are identical in all respects but size, under perfect capital mobility interest rates will be equalized. From interest equalization, capital-to-labor ratios and wage rates are also equalized. International capital°ows, therefore, will lead the two countries to the same long-run level of income, and will cease in the steady state. In other words, the model reduces to the closed economy. 20
A Unionized Small Open Economy
In this sub-section we introduce wage bargaining in the small economy, and examine the two alternative market structures -competition and bargaining -in the large one. In the following discussion, all variables associated with the large country are distinguished by a hat above the relevant variable, while for the small country we adopt the notation developed for the closed economy. We will start with the case of a labor market in the large economy which is subject to bargaining. Next, we consider the case of a perfectly-competitive labor market in the large economy. We will also compare the performances of the small economy under autarky and under openness.
Opening Toward a Unionized Large Economy
Consider now a large economy where wages are determined by negotiations. In the following analysis, we will assume that the parameter¯is uniform across countries. 21 To determine factor prices in the large economy we will¯rst describe the equilibrium in the capital market. As above we assume that capital is perfectly mobile and so it can move after any wage agreement is made. Therefore, given any wage agreement which¯xesŵ t and given the world market rate of interestr t , the¯rm's owner will choosek t to maximize his pro¯ts f(k t ) ¡ŵ t ¡r tkt : Equilibrium in a perfectly-competitive capital market implies that each rm in the economy sets f 0 (k t ) =r t , wherek t is the capital-to-labor ratio of the large economy as a whole. Given this rationally expected level ofk t for each¯rm in the large economy, maximization of the Nash product will give the following wage rate:
To determine factor prices in the small economy, notice that any¯rm will be faced with precisely the same decision as the owner of a¯rm in the large economy. Market conditions will determine the optimal level of the capital stock, which will be the same as in the large economy, i.e., k t =k t . The Nash product will also be identical and so w t =ŵ t .
Given this scenario, each country will evolve like a standard overlapping-generations model with a constant saving rate¯(1 ¡ ®) as in (4). Since wages and capital are equal in the two economies, after one period capital mobility causes there to be an equalization of income. In the long run, international capital°ows will of course be zero. Thus, departing from perfect competition in both countries does not change the predictions of the benchmark in a drastic way, in the sense that convergence to the same level of income and wages still applies. However, not surprisingly, the introduction of bargaining does reduce wages and accumulation in both countries, to a degree which is inversely related to¯. In other words, the model reduces to the closed economy under bargaining.
The comparison with autarky is also relevant. As long as the small economy is a developing country, because of interest-rate equalization the level of the capital-to-labor ratio increases to the same, steady-state level of the large economy as it opens up, and so does the level of each component of total income. So openness has an unambiguously positive impact on the steady-state levels of income and wages, while underdevelopment would have persisted longer under autarky.
Opening Toward a Competitive Large Economy
We now assume that although wages in the small economy are determined by bargaining, those of the large economy are determined competitively, so thatŵ t = f(k t ) ¡k t f 0 (k t ) and
To work out the factor prices in the small economy, we¯rst determine what level of capital stock will be placed there. Since capital is perfectly mobile, it can move after any wage agreement is made. Given any wage agreement which¯xes w t and given the rate of interest in the large economyr t , the capital owner will choose k t to maximize the expression f(k t ) ¡ w t ¡r t (k t ). The solution for this problem will be to invest a level of capital in the home country such that f 0 (k t ) =r t , which implies that the level of the capital-to-labor ratio will be equalized in the two countries, i.e., k t =k t . Given this rationally expected level of k t , maximization of the Nash product gives the following wage rate for the small economy:
i.e., the wage rate in the small economy will be only a fraction of the wage rate in the large one.
In the long run, despite the fact that the steady-state level of per-capita GDP is going to be equalized, the world economy will tend to a steady state where the small open economy displays lower wages than the large economy. Convergence will therefore apply to percapita capital, output and total income, but not to the labor's income share, which will be permanently lower in the unionized small economy. Next, we can examine the implications of the above results for the country's capital account. Since k t =k t , but w t <ŵ t , domestic savings in the home economy fall short of what is required to sustain equilibrium capital accumulation. The gap will be made up by a capital in°ow from the large economy, which can be quanti¯ed exactly, as it is simply given by (1 ¡ ®)(ŵ t ¡ w t ). This implies that, despite per-capita GDP equalization, per-capita GNP will be permanently lower in the small economy. In other words, perfect capital markets allow convergence of per-capita income, but openness does not guarantee convergence of the wage rates when labor market institutions di®er. A more general implication of our analysis is that, if workers turn out poorer in the small unionized economy if compared to workers in the large competitive one, this is to be attributed not to globalization, but to unionization.
Moreover, even thought the small economy remains trapped in a low-wage situation relative to the large country, openness is still preferable to autarky for a developing country, since the level of its capital-to-labor ratio jumps to the higher level which prevails on the large country, which implies a larger level of output to be shared between capital and labor. As a consequence, the small-economy wages increase. To be noticed is that the post-integration level of the capital-to-labor ratio is higher than the level which would have been reached much later as the steady state of a closed economy under bargaining.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between openness and unionization and their joint impact on wage determination is still sparse. Rodrik (1999) examines the empirical determinants of wages in an international perspective and acknowledges the relevance of institutions to labor-market outcomes. He does not, however, looks at the potential e®ect on wages of the di®erences in the labor-market structures of the most relevant partners. Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) con¯rm the presence of an interaction between unionization and openness on wage inequality, with the inclusion of unionization in a regression for wage dispersion weakening the impact of trade, but they do not examine the impact on the wage level. The above theoretical analysis has therefore uncovered a novel connection between globalization and labor institutions, which poses new questions for future empirical investigations on the international determinants of wages.
A Competitive Small Open Economy
In this sub-section we go back to a competitive labor market for the small economy, and analyze the consequences of its interactions with a unionized large country. The case of competition holding in both countries has already been analyzed in sub-section 3.1. To avoid repetition, we can summarize our results as follows. When the large economy is characterized by bargaining, k t =k t and w t >ŵ t , since it can be shown that
. Therefore, the wage in the small economy will be higher than the wage in the large economy, and there will be steady-state capital out°ows toward the large one. The unionized large economy will be chronically under-saving because of the compression of wage income and savings due to the ine±ciency of bargaining. On the other hand, its capital-to-labor ratio will be una®ected, which means that the large economy will not experience that process of de-industrialization that someone fears for the developed world. Moreover, the reason why the large-economy wages are smaller has nothing to do with globalization, but it is a consequence of local unionization. For the small developing economy, the convergence process toward a higher level of capital and income per capita involves -until the adjustment is reached -a fast increase of growth rates. This supports the view expressed in Fields (1994) and Fields and Wan (1989) , who attribute the superior growth performance and the rapidly rising wages experienced by the East Asian economies to the di®erence in the wage-setting process between them and the rest of the world. Related work by Wood (1999) and Saba Arbache (2001) has examined the impact of globalization on unionized developing countries, but with a speci¯c attention to within-country wage inequality, rather than the wage level. Overall, the evidence suggests that the impact has been positive for competitive countries, negative for unionized ones.
The comparison with autarky reveals that once again opening to the rest of the world has an immediate, positive impact on per-capita capital, output and wage income in the small developing economy (whose pre-integration capital-to-labor ratio, prevailing under labor market competition, was still lower than the steady-state level of the large unionized economy). 22 Overall, for all the cases being considered and therefore for any labor institutions, the emerging view of autarky as an underdevelopment trap is consistent with the available evidence in Dowrick and De Long (2001) and Lindert and Williamson (2001) , who stress that the countries that bene¯tted most from globalization were those poor ones that changed their policies to exploit it.
Summary and Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to incorporate di®erential labor market structures When we analyze the interaction between a small open economy and a large one, under di®erent combinations of labor market structures, we¯nd that between-country conver-gence to the same level of per-capita capital, output and total income always obtains, despite di®erences in the labor market structure, when capital markets are fully developed.
However, we also show that convergence to the same distribution of income across factors of production is precluded whenever labor markets are subject to di®erent mechanisms of wage determination. In particular, a unionized country which is facing a fully-competitive partner will always experience a lower wage rate and, as a consequence, undersaving and capital in°ows. Therefore, local labor market institutions are shown to play an important role in the determination of the impact of globalization on within-country income distribution, even in a context where capital markets are competitive. However, if workers end up poorer in a small developing country, if compared to workers in a large country, this is to be attributed not to globalization, but to the relative rigidity of local labor markets. In fact, openness turn out to be always bene¯cial for a small developing country if compared to autarky, and this remains true for any local labor market structure. Table 1 
Note: The subscript A denotes autarkic-case variables.
Our theoretical analysis has uncovered a novel connection between globalization and labor institutions, which poses new questions for future empirical investigations on the international determinants of wages. There are also several policy implications of our results.
Some concern the developed countries as well. In particular, it appears that the ones with less°exible markets for labor have indeed reasons to fear capital out°ows of a large entity.
On the other hand, labor unions and policy-makers in small countries should realize that autarky is the worst possible outcome and that opening to an integrated world economy is always bene¯cial, even though a rigid labor market will prevent local wages to reach the level of those prevailing in a more°exible partner economy.
One limitation of our analysis it that it is derived as a comparison of di®erent scenarios where labor market institutions are taken as exogenous. Since in the reality labor market structures slowly but constantly evolve in response to economic, social and political pressure, future research should focus on the interaction between the increasing integration of the world economy and the shaping of local labor institutions. 23
